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Abstract 
 
A group key agreement protocol enables three or 
more parties to agree on a secret group key to allow 
for communication of secret messages between them.  
In this paper, we consider the security of an efficiency-
improved version of the tree-based group key 
agreement protocol using bilinear maps proposed by 
Lee et al., and claimed to reduce computational costs 
while preserving security.  To be precise, we show 
several attacks on this protocol and discuss how they 
could have been avoided.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
A protocol [4] is a set of rules that define how 
communication is to be done between two or more 
parties.  In a common networked environment where 
the communication channel is open to eavesdropping 
and modifications, security is a critical issue.  In this 
context, security protocols are cryptographic protocols 
that allow communicating parties to perform mutual 
authentication, key exchange or both [5]. 
In [6], Lee et al. proposed a ternary tree-based 
group key agreement protocol by using bilinear maps.  
This builds on the tree-based Diffie-Hellman protocol 
(TGDH) of [9,10].  In this paper, we show how the Lee 
et al. protocol allows both insider and outsider 
attackers to cause group members to compute a group 
key that is known to the attackers. 
In Section 2, we review the group key agreement 
protocol proposed by Lee et al. [6].  We present our 
attacks in Section 3.  We give concluding remarks in 
Section 4. 
 
1.1. Security Criteria for Protocols 
 
A protocol is insecure when its intended security 
goals are not met [1-3].  Among the standard security 
criteria [8-10] for key agreement protocols are as 
follows: 
Group key secrecy. The basic property that it is 
computationally infeasible for a passive attack to 
discover any group key. 
Known-group key secrecy. Knowledge of previous 
group keys will not enable an attacker to know other 
group keys. 
Perfect forward secrecy. Even when the long-term 
private key is compromised, it will not enable an 
attacker to know the values of previous group keys. 
Key-compromise impersonation resilience. Even 
when the long-term private key is compromised, it will 
not enable the attacker to impersonate entities other 
than the owner of the private key. 
Unknown key-share resilience. An attacker 
convinces a group of entities that they share a key with 
the attacker, when in fact the key is shared with 
another entity. 
Key control resilience. It is not possible for any of 
the entities or the attacker to force the group key to be 
a pre-selected value or predict the value of the group 
key. 
 
Lee et al.’s protocol appears to provide group key 
secrecy and known group key secrecy.  Perfect forward 
secrecy and key-compromise impersonation resilience 
are not relevant here since members do not have any 
long-term private keys.  Finally, we will show in the 
later sections how this protocol does not provide 
unknown key-share resilience and key control 
resilience.  
In Section 2, we review the group key agreement 
protocol proposed by Lee et. al [7].  We present our 
attacks in Section 3.  Finally, we conclude in Section 4. 
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2. Tree-Based Group Key Agreement 
 
We now briefly review the tree-based group key 
agreement protocol proposed by Lee et al. in [6].  This 
is basically a direct variant of Kim et al.’s Tree-based 
Group Diffie-Hellman (TGDH) [10] that replaces DH 
with bilinear maps and replaces binary trees with 
ternary trees.  We first define the notations used as 
follows: 
 
N Number of group members 
C Set of current group members 
L Set of leaving members 
Mi ith group member 
h Height of the key tree 
<l,v> vth node at the lth level in a tree 
Ti Mi’s view of the key tree 
Ti’ Mi’s modified tree after membership 
operation 
ri The key, K<l, v> chosen by Mi at node 
<l,v> 
BKi* Set of Mi’s public blinded keys 
P Public information, a point on an 
elliptic curve 
 
Figure 1 shows an example key tree.  Root is at the 0th 
level and the lowest leaves are at the hth level.  Each 
node, <l, v> is associated with the secret key, K<l, v> and 
the blinded key, BK<l, v> = K<l, v>P.  The multiplication 
kP is obtained by repeating k times addition over an 
elliptic curve.  We assume that a leaf node <l, v> is 
associated with Mi, then the node <l, v> has Mi’s 
session random key, K<l, v>.  We further assume that the 
member Mi at node <l, v> knows every key along the 
path from <l, v> to <0, 0>, called the key-path, or his 
view of the tree, Ti.   
 
 
 
Fig.1.  A key tree example 
 
For example, member M3 owns the tree T3 so he knows 
every key {K<2,2>, K<1,0>, K<0,0>} and every bkey, BK3* 
= {BK<2,2>, BK<1,0>, BK<0,0>} on T3.  Any key, K<l, v> can 
be computed with the knowledge of the key in one of 
its three child nodes and the bkeys of the other child 
nodes.  For example in Figure 1, K<1, 1> can be 
computed with the knowledge of K<2, 3>, BK<2, 4> and 
BK<2, 5>, or BK<2, 3>, K<2, 4> and BK<2, 5>, or    BK<2, 3>, 
BK<2, 4> and K<2, 5>.  Since our attacks do not exploit 
how the key is computed, we will omit the description 
here and instead refer the interested reader to [6] for 
further details.  The protocol consists of the join, leave, 
merge and partition operations. 
 
2.1. The Join Operation 
 
This operation specifies what happens and how the 
group keys are updated when a new member, Mn+1 
joins the group.  Figure 2 illustrates how the tree is 
updated while Figure 3 summaries the sequence of 
events.  
 
 
 
Fig.2.  Tree update in join operation 
 
From Figure 3, it is clear that the new member is 
responsible for choosing his own secret key, K<l, v> = 
rn+1 upon wishing to join the group.  He starts with step 
1 by computing the corresponding blinded key, bkey of 
rn+1 and sending this to all existing members of the 
group.  The tree is then updated according to Figure 2.  
An existing member who is the rightmost leaf node in 
the sub-tree rooted at the insertion point would act as 
the sponsor who has to update all bkeys on the affected 
key-path, and broadcast them to all members. 
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2.2   The Leave Operation 
 
Figure 4 similarly summarizes the steps for the 
leave operation when an existing member leaves the 
group. 
Step 1: The new member broadcasts a request for join: 
 
 
Step 2: Every member: 
- if key tree contains the sub-tree that has 2 child nodes, 
add the new member node to update the key tree.  Else, 
add the new member node and new intermediate node 
- remove all keys and bkeys from the leaf node related to 
the sponsor to the root note 
 
The sponsor, Ms additionally: 
- generates new share and computes all [key, bkey] pairs 
on the key-path 
- broadcasts updated Ts’ containing all bkeys: 
 
Step 3: Every member computes the group key using Ts’. 
Fig.3.  Join operation 
Step 1: Every member: 
- update key tree by removing the leaving member 
node 
- remove relevant parent node, if this node has only 
one member node 
- remove all keys and bkeys from the leaf node 
related to the sponsor to the root note 
The sponsor, Ms additionally: 
- generates new share and computes all [key, bkey] 
pairs on the key-path 
- broadcasts updated Ts’ containing all bkeys: 
 
Step 2: Every member computes the group key using 
Ts’. 
Fig. 4.  Leave operation 
 
2.3 The Merge and Partition Operations 
 
The merge and partition operations are merely 
multiple rounds of the join and leave operations, 
respectively. 
 
3.   Attacks on the Protocol 
 
In this section, we show that the scheme fails to 
meet standard security criteria, namely it does not 
provide unknown key-share resilience and key control 
resilience. 
 
3.1  Attacks on the Join Operation 
 
We first present attacks on the join operation.  In 
particular, an attacker (insider or outsider) is able to 
force the group key to a pre-selected value.  This 
shows that the protocol does not provide key control 
resilience.  Attacks on other protocols will be described 
in the next subsection. 
 
Outsider Attack 1: Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) 
Attack on Join Request Message. Recall that whenever 
a new member Mn+1 wishes to join the group, he 
broadcasts a join request message to all members, C 
that contains its own bkey, BK = rn+1P.  Note that 
although one would be unable to derive rn+1 from this 
message, however, an outside attacker could replace 
the entire message rn+1P with another r’n+1P since it 
provides no integrity protection!  Once this is put in 
place, the group key computed by all members, C 
would contain r’n+1, and so this group key can also be 
computed by the attacker. 
 
Outsider Attack 2: Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) 
Attack on Sponsor Broadcast Message. Recall that 
during the join operation, upon successful verification 
of a new member’s join request, the sponsor, Ms would 
send a broadcast message containing all newly 
computed bkeys, BK<n+1> along the key-path [6] of the 
new member.  Due to the same integrity problem 
exploited in Attack 1 above, an outside attacker could 
also replace this broadcast message with its own 
BK’<n+1> , thereby causing all affected members to 
compute new keys in the key-path that can also be 
computed by the attacker. 
 
Insider Attack: Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attack 
on Sponsor Broadcast Message. The previous two 
attacks were carried out by outsiders in order to 
compute the group key.  We also outline an attack that 
is useful to an insider in order to compute any key 
share, K<i> which is not necessarily the group key.  We 
refer to the tree T10 in Figure 2 as an example.  K<1,0> is 
supposed to be known only to M1, M2 and M3.  
However, any other member, for instance M6 could 
replace either one of BK<2,0>, BK<2,1> or BK<2,2> in the 
sponsor broadcast message with its own.  Lets suppose 
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he replaced BK<2,0> with BK’<2,0>.  He can then 
compute K<1,0> by using BK<2,1>, BK<2,2> (which are 
known to every member of the group) and K’<2,0> 
(since this share was used by him to form BK’<2,0> = 
K’<2,0>P). 
 
3.2   Attacks on the Leave Operation 
 
Attacks on the leave operation also follow along 
similar lines as those on the join operation. 
 
Outsider Attack: Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) on 
Sponsor Broadcast Message. In the leave operation, 
once a leaving member has sent out a Leave message, 
the sponsor, Ms sends a broadcast message containing 
all newly computed bkeys, BK<n+1> along the key-path 
of the leaving member.  Due to the same integrity 
problem exploited in the attacks on the join operation, 
an attacker could replace this broadcast message with 
its own BK’<n+1> , causing all affected members to 
compute new keys in the key-path that can also be 
computed by the attacker. 
 
3.3  Extension to Merge and Partition  
 
Since the merge and partition operations are simply 
combinations of several simultaneous join and leave 
operations respectively, our attacks on join and leave 
operations would equally apply to them. 
 
3.4  Unknown Key-Share Attacks 
 
Since this is a key agreement protocol, it should be 
secure against protocol-level attacks; all these should 
be considered as standard security criteria.  However, 
this protocol is not secure against the unknown key-
share attack. 
We refer to Figure 1 as an example.  Suppose M1 
broadcasts a join request message, BK = r8’P that is 
supposedly from a new member, M8.  Other members 
have no way of knowing that this join request message 
did not come from M8 and so a new group key is 
established and all the key shares along the affected 
key path are updated.  M7 thinks he shares the keys 
K<1,2> with M8 when in fact he is sharing it with M1!  
This shows that the protocol does not provide unknown 
key-share resilience. 
 
4  Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper, we have presented attacks on the 
group key agreement protocol proposed by Lee et al. 
and shown that it fails to securely establish a group key 
that should be known only to legitimate group 
members.  We remark that interestingly Kim et al.’s 
protocol [10] upon which Lee et al.’s protocol is 
derived from, does not succumb to our attacks since 
the messages in Kim et al.’s protocol are signed by the 
senders.   
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